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GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE OR 
NATIONAL TAX DISCRIMINATION: 












On August 30, 2016, the European Commission (EC) 
concluded that Ireland and Apple Inc. (Apple) had violated the 
European Union (EU) state aid rules when Ireland granted tax 
advantages to Apple; therefore, the EC ordered Ireland to collect 
up to €13 billion euros ($15.3 billion U.S. dollars) in tax 
underpayments from Apple for the 2003 to 2014 period.1 The 
amount at issue makes this case one of the largest tax 
controversies in history and has generated a lot of press as a 
result.2 
 
While the amount in the EC vs. Apple case is 
unprecedented, it is only one of several EC Decisions dealing 
with the taxation of multinational transfer pricing activities 
issued recently, possibly in response to both a United States 
(U.S.) Senate investigation into U.S. multinational tax practices 
and the “Luxembourg Leaks” documents released by the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.3 Arguing 
that each multinational firm received illegal state aid, the EC has 
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recently initiated or finalized decisions adverse to Google4, 
Starbucks,5 Apple6 and Amazon7 based on the specific transfer 
pricing methodologies each used with the endorsement of tax 
authorities in several EU member states.8 
 
Each of the EC’s Decisions finds that a EU Member 
State granted state aid in violation of the Treaty on the Function 
of the European Union (TFEU), Article: 107(1).9 The EC found 
that each of the rulings at issue provided an advantage to a 
specific taxpayer or class taxpayers.10 While it is clear that the 
EC can examine EU Member State tax ruling practices for the 
type of “selectivity” or discrimination that would constitute 
illegal state aid in contravention of the TFEU,11 the recent EC 
decisions exceeded the scope of the EC’s authority by 
questioning the general relevant principles and provisions of 
Member State law without showing that the challenged practices 
were selective. 
 
The EC’s Decisions have been harshly criticized by 
multinational firms and regulators but appear to reflect prior 
criticism that some experts have levied against multinational 
companies and low-tax jurisdictions.12 It is probable that the 
EC’s power to review Member State tax laws and tax ruling 
practices under state aid principles will be decided by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the next decade. 
 
The issue is whether the EC has the right to override state 
sovereignty in order to enforce a global tax governance structure 
based on the EC’s tax sovereignty principles. Under ECJ case 
law, a finding of state aid requires a finding of selectivity and a 
finding of advantage.13 In the rulings at issue, however, the EC 
has conflated the selectivity and advantage criterion into a single 
concept of selective advantage, thereby minimizing the 
selectivity requirement despite the fact that selectivity is an 
important part of state aid jurisprudence.14 Basically, the EC is 
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violating state sovereignty by creating its own interpretation of 
tax sovereignty in order to enforce its own brand of global tax 
governance. 
 
This article theorizes that the EC’s enforcement initiative 
could harm the global economy through the erosion of tax 
certainty and that the EC’s retroactive application of the EC’s 
interpretive tax sovereignty principle is not supported by ECJ 
law. The EC’s version of tax sovereignty will likely exacerbate 
the very harms that the state aid rules were implemented to 
prevent. Instead of creating a structure of global tax governance, 
the EC appears to be creating a global chaos of tax uncertainty 




II. EVALUATING GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE 
 
The international economy raises important questions 
about the structure of global tax governance systems intended to 
protect markets where globalization implies the erosion of 
national boundaries.15 In this respect, it can be argued that the 
power to implement national regulations within those 
boundaries declines because people can easily leave their 
jurisdictions and because the flows of capital are too large and 
sudden for any one regulator to control.16 
 
In contrast, the liberal globalist response to the concern 
about the erosion of state regulatory power is to build a larger 
global apparatus, such as the United Nations or EC systems 
constituted by a legally binding treaty, with expanding 
governance powers.17 With the globalization of tax transactions 
and increasing interdependence among nation-states, there is a 
growing conflict between the conventional notion of state 
sovereignty and the flow of tax activity, which disrupts 
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coherence of the state. In the meantime, the various agencies and 
institutions within the state, such as independent central banks, 
develop a high degree of independence reflecting the 
fragmentation or desegregation of the nation-state.18 
 
When it came to tax issues, Westphalian sovereignty at 
one time was largely respected. The basic rule of Westphalian 
sovereignty is non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states, guaranteeing the autonomy of the national political 
authorities over a nation-state’s territory.19 Non-intervention is 
closely linked to the idea of self-determination, which many felt 
was necessary to the growth and development of a nation-state.20 
In recent decades, Westphalian sovereignty has been 
undermined due to the increasing mobility of the tax base, 
especially capital. Regulatory changes such as the 
discontinuation of capital controls in one nation-state can affect 
not only the economies of the surrounding nation-states but even 
the nation-states in other parts of the world. Economic agents 
can now move their various forms of capital between nations and 
shop for the lowest tax burden and this led to calls for more 
global tax governance.21 
 
Global governance establishes rules dealing with issues 
that each nation already regulates within its territorial 
boundaries such as crime, pollution, securities fraud and tax 
evasion. In contrast, traditional international law requires 
nation-states to implement the international obligations they 
incur through their own domestic law22. Transgovernmentalism 
supporters claim that the enforcement of domestic law has been 
made more difficult due to globalization propelled by the 
information revolution.23 The transgovernmentalist view 
stresses that regulators potentially reap the benefits from 
coordinating their enforcement efforts with those of their foreign 
peers and from ensuring that other nation-states adopt similar 
approaches.24 
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Transgovernmentalists likewise argue that the domestic 
order fragmentation of the nation-state is essential to the 
development of the global regulatory governance system. They 
claim that the global governance of the economy requires the 
globalization of state agencies as long as these agencies maintain 
a high degree of autonomy and independence. To 
transgovernmentalists, the transformation of state sovereignty 
represents the regulatory harmonization through “the 
nationalization of international law.”25 Transgovernmentalists 
highlight that each nation-state will be better able to enforce its 
domestic law by implementing the agreement if foreign peers do 
likewise in accordance with regulatory agreements that are 
pledges of self-enforcing good faith.26 
 
In 2009, a U.S. federal court in Florida ruled that the 
Swiss bank UBS had to provide client information for up to 
52,000 U.S. citizens to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
Before this case was finally settled, a Swiss government official 
stated that “the court would be substituting its own authority for 
that of the competent Swiss authorities, and therefore would 
violate Swiss sovereignty and international law.”27 It seems that 
nations are now expected to shift fiscal competencies up the 
ladder of governance and is incompatible with the notion of state 
sovereignty. Shifting fiscal competencies in such a way endows 
supra-national institutions, such as the EC, with the power to 
govern nations based on their own principles, which may run 




III.  IRELAND AND THE EU 
 
With regard to the EC vs. Apple and Ireland case, the 
argument can be made that Ireland decided to enter into an 
agreement with Apple based on Irish values and needs. To the 
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Irish, employment opportunities may be more important than 
massive taxes. If the Irish feel that the only way to lure a large, 
global company such as Apple to its borders is by reducing the 
tax burden the global company has to pay, why does the EC have 
the ethical duty to override the Irish belief regarding taxes? Does 
the EC provide job opportunities to the local Irish citizens? If the 
answer is no, then who is the EC to decide what Irish agreements 
should be upheld and what Irish agreements should be 
overruled? 
 
In the U.S., there is a Federal tax code that is applicable 
to all U.S. citizens and residents regardless of where they 
reside.29 The IRS is responsible for enforcing and collecting 
Federal taxes.30 Each state in the U.S. has its own tax code in 
addition to the Federal tax code. State taxes are only applicable 
to the residents of that particular state and there is no uniformed 
collection agency for state taxes.31 When there is a conflict 
between Federal tax and State tax, the Federal tax code prevails 
under the supremacy clause of the US Constitution.32 
 
While the U.S. operates under federalism, the EU does 
not. Although the EU founders wanted federalism, years of 
negotiations ultimately resulted in the rejection of such a 
system.33 As a result, the EU does not impose a tax on EU 
citizens and each EU citizen is taxed in her/his respective 
member state.34 
 
After a failed attempt to establish an EU Constitution,35 
the Treaty of Lisbon was pushed forward to incorporate many of 
the EU Constitutional principles.36 All of the EU member states 
agreed to ratify the treaty through their respective legislatures, 
except for Ireland. Due to concerns over the loss of Irish 
sovereignty, two-thirds of the Irish public voted against the 
Treaty of Lisbon.37 Since the incorporation of a treaty into EU 
law requires the unanimous agreement of all the member states, 
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the Treaty of Lisbon was not ratified and failed to become part 
of EU law; therefore, the EU was forced to make specific 
concessions to Ireland to encourage a “yes” vote in a second 
referendum.38 
 
The major concession made to Ireland was regarding its 
tax law. In exchange for a “yes” vote, Ireland and the other 
European leaders agreed to a special protocol,39 specific only to 
Ireland and having no effect on the other EU member states.40 
Ireland was provided several guarantees including competence 
over its own tax laws. After receiving this protocol from the EU, 
the Irish public voted two-thirds in favor to ratify the Treaty of 
Lisbon.41 While the EU still lacks competence over the tax codes 
of the member states, it participates in the Organization for 




IV.  THE OECD 
  
 The OECD provides tax policies and guidelines that have 
facilitated the elimination of harmful tax laws.43 Over thirty 
nations, including several EU members, participate in the OECD 
and contribute to the development of policies and practices for 
greater economic cooperation. The release of the OECD’s 
Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital (OECD Model) facilitated the growth of bilateral tax 
agreements – from less than one-hundred prior to its release, to 
over 3,000 and many nations rely on it for treaty text.44 
 
 One of the OECD’s most astute contributions to global 
tax has been its transfer pricing guidelines. Transfer pricing is 
the process multinational corporations use to assign values to 
goods and services that involve global transactions between 
related corporations. The OECD’s 1979 Transfer Pricing and 
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Multinational Enterprises Report (OECD Report) created the 
arm’s length principle, which provides that transactions between 
related corporations “should not be treated differently for tax 
purposes from similar transactions between independent parties 
solely by virtue of the fact that the enterprises are associated.”45 
Although the OECD Report was officially repealed in 1995, the 
arm’s length principle remained the standard in evaluating 
transfer pricing agreements. 
 
 Following the 2008 global crisis, the OECD issued the 
2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrations (OECD Guidelines). The OECD 
Guidelines reaffirmed the arm’s length principle as the 
appropriate standard for evaluating transfer pricing.46 Many 
OECD member nations formally adopted the OECD Guidelines 
into their national laws even though the were not required to do 
so.47 
 
 As many nations continued to face fiscal crises after 
2008, the OECD identified Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) as a problem and created the BEPS Project to address 
the mismatches in tax rules that allow a corporation to pay low 
tax or no tax on its profits. The BEPS Project held its first 
meeting in 2016 and more than eighty nations participated 
including Ireland and the US. While the BEPS Project strives to 
reduce global tax avoidance, many multinational corporations 
take advantage of the differences between nations’ tax systems, 
including Apple, which utilized the difference between the US 
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V. U.S. VS. IRELAND TAX LAW 
 
 The difference between U.S. corporate tax law and Irish 
corporate tax law creates a tax haven for multinational 
corporations. Under the U.S. incorporation system, a 
corporation is subject to U.S. tax only when it is incorporated in 
the U.S. Under the Irish incorporation system, a corporation is 
subject to Irish tax only when it resides in Ireland.49 As an 
example, suppose DEF Corp. is incorporated in New York, 
which subjects it to the U.S. corporate tax rate of 35 percent. 
Now suppose DEF Corp. is also incorporated in Ireland. The fact 
that DEF Corp. is incorporated in Ireland does not automatically 
subject it to the Irish corporate tax of 12.5%; in order for DEF 
Corp. to be subjected to the Irish tax, it would need to meet the 
Irish residency requirements. 
 
 The Irish tax residence definition differs from the global 
tax residence definition. Under the global tax law, residence is 
decided by the taxpayer’s physical and economic state 
presence.50 Ireland does not define tax residence in its tax code 
and instead adopted the United Kingdom’s judicially-created 
residency test.51 In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. Vs Howe, 
De Beers was incorporated in South Africa where it operated 
diamond mines but maintained an office in the United Kingdom 
where nine of De Beers’ sixteen board members were located. 
The court found that a corporation is a resident where its central 
management and control were located and concluded that De 
Beers was a resident of the United Kingdom.52 
 
 Now suppose DEF Corp. is incorporated in Ireland with 
its central management and control is based in its New York 
office. Under Irish tax law, the fact that DEF Corp.’s central 
management and control is in New York means that DEF Corp. 
could avoid paying the Irish corporate tax of 12.5 percent. The 
difference between the Irish and global tax systems helped 
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Ireland attract some of the largest multinational corporations in 
the world, including Apple. 
 
 Apple’s tax loophole in Ireland was codified by applying 
the OECD Model as well as the 1997 US Tax Convention with 
Ireland. Since Apple’s subsidiaries were incorporated in Ireland, 
none of them were subject to U.S. corporate tax. Furthermore, 
since the central management and control of Apple’s 
subsidiaries were located in Apple’s headquarters in the US, the 
subsidiaries were not subject to Irish corporate tax.53 Basically, 
Apple legitimized its tax-free structure through the OECD 
Model and a bilateral tax treaty between the US and Ireland. 
 
 Another tax arrangement between Apple and Ireland 
involved one of Apple’s subsidiaries, Apple Sales International 
(ASI). In 1991, Apple created the Irish subsidiary of ASI, which 
recorded all of Apple’s profits in Europe, Africa, the Middle 
East and India. If someone bought a phone in Spain for example, 
the sale would be recorded by ASI in Ireland, not in Spain. ASI 
then paid the annual Irish tax rates that were in the range of .005 
percent and 1 percent until 2014, according to the profit-sharing 
agreement between Ireland and Apple. Ireland had one of the 
lowest corporate tax rates in the EU – 12.5 percent – while most 
of the other EU member states had corporate tax rates of over 16 
percent with the Belgium tax rate rising as high as 33.9 percent.54 
 
 Although Apple was one of the top technology 
companies during the 1980s, the stiff competition from 
Microsoft and Windows during the 1990s caused Apple to 
restructure pricing allocation among its Irish subsidiaries.55 In 
1991, Apple received a ruling from the Irish government which 
allowed Apple to allocate 65% of its operating expenses to its 
subsidiary, Apple Operations Europe (AOE), for revenue up to 
$60 - $70 million and 20% of operating expenses for any excess 
revenue. In 2007, Apple received another ruling that approved 
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Apple’s reduced operating expenses allocation of 10-20% and it 
inclusion of a 1% to 9% Intellectual Property return to its AOE 
subsidiary. The 1991 Irish government ruling stated that all 
revenue attributed to ASI would be taxed at 12.5% and the 2007 
Irish government ruling allocated 8% to 18% of operating costs 
to ASI. These rulings caught the attention of the US 
government.56 
 
 In 2013, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs (Subcommittee) started to investigate 
Apple’s off-shore profit sharing arrangements. Apple denied the 
use of illegal tax schemes and suggested that US corporate tax 
law be updated in light of the new digital age. While the 
Subcommittee eventually found that current US laws did not 
prohibit Apple’s tax structure in Ireland, the investigation caught 




VI. THE EC VS. APPLE 
  
In 2014, the EC opened an investigation to determine if 
the 1991 and 1997 Irish tax rulings granted to Apple constituted 
state aid in violation of the TFEU.58 According to the EU, state 
aid is illegal when a Member State provides a company a 
selective advantage that distorts or attempts to distort 
competition. All EU member states are required to receive EC 
approval prior to granting state aid. If an EU member state grants 
state aid that violates the TFEU, then the EC must recover the 
illegal state aid from the recipient.59 
 
In the U.S., there is no equivalent for EU state aid; in 
fact, the U.S. has a different policy regarding corporate 
subsidies. US corporations enjoy subsidies in the form of grants, 
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loans and/or tax breaks from both the federal and state 
governments.60 Federal government grants and tax credits often 
total billions of dollars, while federal loans and bailouts exceed 
trillions. Unlike the EU, the U.S. had not adopted strict 
guidelines on the use of government subsidies to corporations.61 
 
The EU scrutinizes corporate subsidies that the US 
commonly provides, such as agriculture, energy and 
transportation.62 State aid rules are difficult for U.S. 
multinationals to navigate, especially since they come from a 
nation that provides corporations generous tax credits.63 This 
may explain why the EC’s decision was unchartered territory for 
Apple. 
 
In reviewing the Irish tax rulings, the EC found that 
Apple received illegal state aid in violation of the TFEU. 
According to the EC, the tax rulings allowed Apple to engage in 
transfer pricing that did not reflect the economic realities of the 
transactions. This allowed Apple to allocate millions in profits 
to specific Apple subsidiaries in Ireland that were not subject to 
taxes in any nation. 
 
In deciding that Apple’s transfer pricing was not proper, 
the EC relied on the 2010 OECD Report Guidelines. The EC 
found that Apple did not provide the proper documentation 
supporting its transfer pricing tax proposal to the Office of the 
Revenue Commissioners as required by Section V of the OECD 
Report Guidelines. Furthermore, the EC found that one of 
Apple’s subsidiaries in Ireland had no real activities 
demonstrating the lack of economic justification for the transfer 
pricing allocation. 
 
It was apparent to the EC that Apple received state aid 
from Ireland. The Irish tax rulings were selective because they 
were directed solely towards Apple. These rulings also provided 
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Apple with an advantage in the EU since it paid significantly 
lower taxes, allowing it to allocate more money to advancing its 
global operations. This tax avoidance allowed Apple to receive 
a substantial benefit compared to other businesses, which 




VII. THE VIOLATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
AND DISCRIMINATION  
 
 As stated earlier, the EU granted concessions to Ireland 
in exchange for Ireland voting “yes” to accepting the Treaty of 
Lisbon. One of these concessions was allowing Ireland to retain 
competence over its own tax laws.64 This means that Ireland 
shouldn’t need to obtain approval from the EC in order to grant 
state aid to Apple or any other company. It seems that the EU is 
ignoring the protocol it granted to Ireland in exchange for its 
vote. If the EU can ignore the agreements it creates with member 
nations, it means that the EU can violate the sovereignty of those 
nations. 
 
 Again, the EU does not practice federalism as the US 
does. Federalism was attempted by the EU but rejected by the 
member states. The EU does not impose taxes EU citizens and 
each EU citizen is taxed in her/his own member state.65 So, since 
the EU does not have the power to tax EU citizens, the EU 
shouldn’t be imposing a retrospective tax on Apple for doing 
business in Ireland. 
 
 Apple’s tax arrangement in Ireland did not constitute 
state aid within the meaning of the TFEU since it failed to meet 
the “selective advantage” requirement.66 Just as Apple did, Irish 
corporations could have avoided paying the Irish corporate tax 
by incorporating in Ireland and establishing management and 
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control in another country; this arrangement was not limited to 
Apple. Furthermore, even if the Irish tax rulings did meet the 
“selective advantage” requirement, they can’t be deemed to 
distort or attempt to distort competition since there is no unified 
EU tax system. Since there is no unified EU tax sovereignty, the 
EU is once again violating the state sovereignty of Ireland. 
 
 Many US government officials have condemned the 
EC’s decision against Apple. The US Treasury Department 
announced that it believed the EU was reaching into US 
corporations in order to take US tax revenue.67 Other sources 
have examined the EC’s investigations into US corporation tax 
structures in EU member nations as discriminatory litigation. 
While many recognize the longstanding concept of state aid, 
they find that pursuing civil investigations primarily against US 
companies under a new interpretation of state aid creates 
disturbing global tax policy precedents.68 Many also feel that 
imposing a giant tax bill on company years after the fact sends 
the wrong message to global job creators.69 
 
 Indicative of the EC’s discriminatory practices against 
US firms are the recent investigations into Google and 
Amazon.70 Google was investigated by the EC for alleged 
antitrust and data privacy violations and is now being 
investigated for violating the tax policies of France, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. In 2016, Google’s offices in France and 
Spain were raided by the EC as part of the investigation. 
Amazon is being investigated for the alleged violation of state 
aid in Luxembourg.71 
 
The EC’s investigations into US corporations has 
prompted US retaliation against the EU. The US Treasury and 
the IRS issued Notice 2016-52 addressing proposed regulations 
for foreign tax credits used to offset US tax obligations. The US 
is concerned that US corporations will now be able to offset 
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current US tax obligations to a greater extent since the EC is 
assessing tax years that are more than two years prior to the 
current tax year. If the EC continues to target US corporations 
and assess back taxes on the basis of illegal state aid, the US will 
have major tax revenue losses stemming from foreign tax 
credits.72 
 
To avoid the major foreign tax credit loss, the US 
Treasury and the IRS are reducing foreign tax credits. The 
reduction of foreign tax credits could in turn reduce foreign 
investment since US corporations may be faced with the 
possibility of paying double taxation on certain foreign earnings. 
Since both the EU and the US can’t really afford reductions in 
their respective economies, the ECJ should reject the EC’s 
decision against Apple in order to discourage the EC’s 




VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The EC’s recent actions regarding US multinational 
corporations raises important questions about the structure of 
global tax governance systems intended to protect markets 
where globalization implies the erosion of national boundaries. 
With the globalization of tax transactions and increasing 
interdependence among nations, there is a growing conflict 
between the traditional notion of state sovereignty and tax 
sovereignty, which disrupts coherence of the state. 
 
 The EU member-states rejected the notion of the EU 
serving in a federal capacity; therefore, the EU does not impose 
a tax on EU citizens and each EU citizen is taxed in his or her 
respective member state. Furthermore, the EU does not negotiate 
member state tax treaties or implement member state tax policies 
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for each member state -- that is left to each of the member states 
to decide as sovereign nations. Yet, the EC is now imposing 
retrospective taxes on US multinational companies as if the EC 
is a federal EU tax sovereignty. Since the EU does not have the 
right to override state sovereignty and impose its own 
discriminatory judgments against multinational companies, the 
Member States should challenge the authority of the EU. 
 
 It seems as if sovereign nations must now shift their 
fiscal competencies up the ladder of governance and this is a 
violation of state sovereignty. But if the EC can override a 
sovereign nation’s tax policy, then it will cause confusion among 
corporations as to what tax law should be followed. Apple can 
enter into a tax agreement with the Irish government but not with 
the EC so the EC should not be allowed to erode the integrity of 
the Irish government. 
 
 The EC’s example of retrospective taxation sends a 
wrong signal to the global business community since any tax 
breaks awarded by a sovereign member nation could be reversed 
by the EC. The entire investment made by a company could be 
forfeited just because the EC deems a tax arrangement to be 
unfair. These cases do not set a good precedent and may 
discourage companies from investing in EU nations if there are 
better alternatives in other parts of the world. Accordingly, the 
ECJ should respect state sovereignty and reject discriminatory 
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